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IS GOD "SIGNIFICANTLY FREE?" 
Wesley Morriston 
In an impressive series of books and articles, Alvin Plantinga has developed 
challenging new versions of two much discussed pieces of philosophical theology: 
the free will defense and the ontological argument. 1 His treatment of both subjects 
has provoked a tremendous amount of critical comment. What has not been 
generally noticed2 , however, is that when taken together, Plantinga's views on 
these two subjects lead to a very serious problem in philosophical theology. The 
premises of his version of the ontological argument, when combined with the 
presuppositions of the free will defense, appear to entail that God is not free to 
choose between good and evil and thus is not "good" in the distinctively moral 
sense of this word. In the present paper, I shall explain how this problem arises, 
and explore two different ways of trying to deal with it. 
I 
According to the free will defense, God can't prevent human beings from 
doing evil without depriving them of what Plantinga calls "significant freedom"-
of the freedom to choose between good and evil. 3 But if human beings were not 
significantly free in this sense, they would not be responsible for their moral 
choices, and a distinctive kind of goodness-moral goodness--could not be 
realized in their lives. Of course, many human beings abuse their freedom, and 
the result is a fearful amount of moral evil. But many others choose good over 
evil, and enough moral goodness is realized in their lives to outweigh all the 
evil that human beings do. 4 
Significant freedom is thus asserted to be a necessary condition of moral 
goodness. But what, exactly, are we to understand by "freedom" in this context? 
In God, Freedom. and Evil, Plantinga gives the following answer: 
If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to 
perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent 
conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, 
or that he won't. It is within his power, at the time in question, to take 
or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it. GFE. p. 29. 
As Plantinga defines it, then, significant freedom is not compatible with deter-
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minism. The reason for insisting on this point in the context of a free will defense 
should be clear. If a compatibilist analysis of freedom and responsibility were 
acceptable, it would be open to an opponent of the free will defense to argue 
that God does not have to permit moral evil in order to create significantly free 
creatures who are capable of moral goodness. For example, He could instill in 
each of His creatures an irresistible impulse to do what is right and to refrain 
from doing evil, without thereby diminishing their freedom and responsibility. 
With these points in mind, I tum briefly to Plantinga' s defense of the ontological 
argument. The feature of the argument that is relevant to our discussion is 
Plantinga's account of "maximal greatness" and "maximal excellence." Plantinga 
offers the following analysis of these concepts: 
(27) A Being has maximal greatness in a given world only if it has 
maximal excellence in every world. 
(28) A being has maximal excellence in a given world only if it has 
omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in that world. GFE, 
p. 108 
Given (27) and (28), Plantinga argues that if it is possible that there is a being 
possessing maximal greatness, then such a being must actually exist. 5 
Now it is easy to see that, on the presuppositions of the free will defense, the 
God of the ontological argument is neither significantly free nor morally perfect. 
For suppose that God exists and is a being with maximal greatness. Taken 
together, (27) and (28) entail that God is morally peifect in every possible world. 
Since moral perfection is incompatible with wrongdoing, it follows that there is 
no possible world in which God performs a wrong action. In other words, God's 
nature is such that it is logically impossible for Him to perform a wrong action. 
He is determined-in the strongest possible sense of "determined"-not to per-
form any wrong actions. Thus it seems that, on Plantinga's analysis of significant 
freedom, God is not significantly free. And since moral goodness presupposes 
significant freedom, it also follows that God is not morally good, which is as 
near as makes no matter to saying that God is not morally perfect! 
The problem, in short, is that the presuppositions of the free will defense 
entail that moral goodness cannot be an essential property of any person, whereas 
the premises of the ontological argument entail that moral goodness is an essential 
property of at least one person, viz. God. Thus it seems that a theist cannot 
consistently give the free will defense if he accepts the ontological argument, 
and vice versa. 
It's worth noting in passing that even if God were not significantly free, He 
might still be free with regard to some actions. If it would not be wrong for God 
to perform an act, and also not wrong for God not to perform it, then, for all I 
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have shown, He might be free either to perform that act or to refrain from 
performing it. One recent author" has exploited this point in connection with 
God's freedom to decide which possible world to actualize. If, among the worlds 
God could have actualized, there is no one best world, then God's essential 
perfection does not completely determine his choice among worlds. Perhaps 
ther~ are two or more equally good possible worlds, in which case God would 
be free to actualize either of them. Or perhaps for any given possible world, 
there is a world better than it. Then, assuming that God's goodness permits him 
to actualize some world or other, he would be free to choose among a variety 
of worlds. Thus it seems that God's essential goodness is not inconsistent with 
his being free to choose among some alternative courses of action. 7 
I think this is probably correct. But it does nothing to solve the problem I 
have raised." For even if God has the maximum amount of freedom allowed by 
his essential goodness, the fact that he is essentially good entails that he is never 
free when anything morally significant is at stake. Whenever, from the moral 
point of view, it matters what God does, his decision is completely determined 
by his nature. So given the incompatibilist assumptions of the free will defense, 
it still follows that God is not morally good. We can say, if we like, that in any 
given situation God would do what is morally required of an agent who is 
significantly free in that situation. But since God cannot fail to act as a significantly 
free agent ought to act, it follows that He is not Himself significantly free, and 
cannot therefore be the subject of genuinely moral praise or blame. 
II 
Short of jettisoning either the free will defense or the ontological argument, 
how might a theist try to deal with this problem? I can think of two different 
strategies. The first would be to admit that God is not significantly free, accepting 
the implication that he is not good in the distinctively moral sense that is involved 
in the free will defense, while denying that this constitutes an imperfection in 
God's nature. Thus it might be said that He is unable to do evil only because 
He possesses maximal greatness. He lacks moral goodness only because He is 
essentially and perfectly good. Indeed, it might be said that His kind of goodness 
is infinitely superior to the sort of goodness that is realized when one of His 
significantly free creatures chooses good over evil. 
On this view, we are right to praise God for his goodness, as long as we do 
not praise him in that distinctively moral sense that presupposes moral responsi-
bility and significant freedom. In somewhat the way that we might praise a 
beautiful sunset, we can praise the absolute perfection of God's nature. (Other 
religious attitudes, such as gratitude, might be more difficult to deal with.) 
We can even continue to speak of God's freedom if we are careful not to use 
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the word "free" in the incompatibilist sense required by the free will defense. 
We can say, for example, that God enjoys absolute freedom from temptation, 
that he is completely free from the sorts of mental conflict that human beings 
experience when a base desire overcomes a higher one, and so on. All of this 
is compatible with denying that God is "significantly free" in Plantinga's sense 
of this expression. 
Doubtless there is a great deal to be said for this way of speaking about God's 
goodness and freedom. But will it really help us reconcile the free will defense 
with the ontological argument? It might seem so. For the present proposal in no 
way challenges the claim that moral goodness presupposes significant freedom 
in Plantinga's sense. At the same time, it leaves the ontological argument largely 
intact. At most it would force us to drop moral perfection as a requirement for 
maximal excellence, replacing it with the requirement that a maximally excellent 
being be perfectly good in a sense of "good" that does not presuppose significant 
freedom. 
The trouble is that if we are to exploit the concept of significant freedom in 
a free will defense, we must believe that the distinctively moral sort of goodness-
the sort of goodness that can only be realized in the lives of significantly free 
beings-is a very superior sort of goodness: we must believe it to be superior 
to any alternative sort of goodness that could have been realized in the lives of 
creatures who are not significantly free. If we don't believe this, we can't 
reasonably claim that God is justified in permitting so much moral evil. For as 
I pointed out earlier, an omnipotent God could have instilled in each and every 
one of his creatures an irresistible will to do what is right. And while it is true 
that such creatures would be neither significantly free nor morally good, it is 
also true that other kinds of goodness could be realized in their lives. They could 
be kind, compassionate, forbearing, etc. Best of all, they would always do what 
is right! If this kind of goodness were not inferior to the sort of goodness that 
presupposes significant freedom, we would have to say that God could have 
realized just as much goodness, while preventing a great deal of evil, by creating 
innocent automata instead of significantly free creatures. Instead of being the 
cornerstone of a convincing defense against the atheological argument from evil, 
significant freedom would itself be an evil in need of explanation! 
Now recall that, on the proposal under consideration, God's own perfect 
goodness prevents him from being either significantly free or morally good.!t 
seems to follow that the sort of innocent automata I described in the last paragraph 
would be much closer to the image of God than would significantly free creatures. 
Their sort of goodness is a much closer analogue of God's kind of goodness 
than is the moral goodness of significantly free creatures. This strongly suggests 
that the goodness of innocent automata is superior to the moral goodness of 
significantly free beings, contrary to what is required for a successful free will 
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defense. So it looks as if we still have to choose between the free will defense 
and the doctrine that God is essentially perfect. 
In order to get around this problem, we would have to claim that God's kind 
of goodness should be judged by a standard different from the one by which we 
judge the goodness of His creatures. We would have to claim that the inability 
to do evil is not an imperfection in God, even though it would be a grave 
imperfection in His creatures. In the absence of a well worked out and defended 
justification, however, such a double standard is bound to seem unacceptably 
arbitrary and ad hoc. I do not myself see how it can be defended. 
III 
Assuming that the argument of the last section is correct, it seems that a theist 
who wants to hang onto the free will defense should say that God is morally 
perfect, accepting the implication that God is significantly free. But he will then 
have to deny that God is morally perfect in every possible world; for if a person 
is significantly free, there must be worlds in which he goes wrong with respect 
to some action, and in those worlds he is not morally perfect. 
The very notion of a being that is morally perfect in every possible world thus 
turns out to be self-contradictory. But on Plantinga's analysis of maximal great-
ness, a maximally great being must be morally perfect in every possible world. 
So it seems that the notion of a maximally great being is equally self-contradictory. 
There simply could be no such thing as a maximally great being in Plantinga's 
sense. 
Does this mean that a theist who is committed to the free will defense must 
give up the ontological argument? Not necessarily. I believe that the argument 
can be revised in such a way that its premises do not entail that God is morally 
perfect in every possible world. But a heavy price must be paid for such a 
revision. For the premises of the revised ontological argument will not entail 
that God is morally perfect in the actual world. 
To see how Plantinga's version of the ontological argument might be revised, 
we need to distinguish in a rough and ready way between two sorts of excellences: 
moral excellences and nonmoral excellences. Moral excellences would include 
such things as "never doing anything wrong." Nonmoral excellences would 
include such things as omnipotence and omniscience. Next, we draw a corres-
ponding distinction between two sorts of maximal excellence. Maximal moral 
excellence would be the best possible combination of moral excellences; it would 
be identical to what I have been calling moral perfection. Maximal nonmoral 
excellence would be the best possible combination of nonmoral excellences. A 
being possessing maximal nonmoral excellence would have to be omnipotent 
and omniscient. 
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Since we are operating on the assumption that the presuppositions of the free 
will defense are correct, we must say that nothing could possess maximal moral 
excellence in every possible world. But the same need not be true of maximal 
nonmoral excellence. As far as the argument of this paper is concerned, it might 
perfectly well be the case that something is omnipotent, omniscient, etc., in 
every possible world. 
With these distinctions in mind, we can construct weaker analogues of Plan-
tinga's (27) and (28): 
(27*) A being has maximal nonmoral greatness in a given only if it has 
maximal nonmoral excellence in every world. 
(28*) A being has maximal nonmoral excellence in a given world only 
if it has omniscience and omnipotence in that world. 
Obviously, (27*) and (28*) are constructed in such a way that they do not entail 
that God is morally perfect in every possible world. As far as (27*) and (28*) 
are concerned, it may perfectly well be the case that God has the power to 
perform wrong actions-in which case there will be possible worlds in which 
he does so. So (27*) and (28*) would enable us to construct an argument for 
saying that if it is possible that there is a being having maximal nonmoral 
greatness, then such a being must actually exist. All we have to do is to replace 
"maximal greatness" and "maximal excellence," throughout Plantinga' s version 
of the ontological argument, by "maximal nonmoral greatness" and "maximal 
nonmoral excellence."9 Thus revised, the ontological argument gives the theist 
only part of what he wants. It gives him an argument for the existence of a being 
that is omnipotent and omniscient. But it does not give him any grounds for 
saying that this being is also morally good or morally perfect. Consequently, it 
does not give him an argument for the claim that there is a maximally great 
being in Plantinga's sense of "maximally great." 
From the present perspective, of course, we don't want an argument for the 
claim that there is a being that is "maximally great" in Plantinga's sense. Such 
a being would have to possess maximal moral excellence in every world, and 
this, as we have seen, is logically impossible. Does this mean that we must 
completely abandon the Anselmian conception of God as a maximally great 
being, as the being greater than which none can be conceived? I don't think so. 
What we need to do is simply to substitute for Plantinga's account of the nature 
of maximal greatness an analysis that is more in keeping with the requirements 
of the free will defense. I suggest that we think of a maximally great being as 
a being possessing the best possible combination of perfections, both moral and 
nonmoral. More precisely: 
(27**) A being is maximally great in a given world if and only if: (i) 
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it possesses maximal moral excellence in that world; and (ii) it possesses 
maximal nonmoral excellence in every world. 
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Or, equivalently, in the light of our definition of "maximal nonmoral greatness ," 
we might express (27**) as follows: 
A being is maximally great in a given world if and only if it possesses 
maximal moral excellence and maximal nonmoral greatness in that 
world. 
An important implication of (27**) is that no being-not even a maximally 
great one--could be maximally great in every possible world. To see why, let 
Sam be a maximally great being (in our sense of maximally great). It follows 
that Sam is morally perfect, and thus significantly free. But then there are worlds 
in which Sam performs wrong actions. In those worlds, Sam is not morally 
perfect. In those worlds, therefore, Sam is not maximally great. But this need 
not be due to any imperfection in Sam's nature. It is simply an implication of 
the fact that Sam is maximally great. 
Adopting Nelson Pike's convention,IO I suggest that we use the term word 
"God" to designate a title that belongs to anyone who is maximally great, and 
that we use the expression "Yahweh" as a rigid designator for the individual 
(assuming there is one) who holds this title. It follows from what I said in the 
last paragraph that Yahweh 'might not have held this title. For there are possible 
worlds in which Yahweh lacks maximal moral excellence, and in those worlds, 
Yahweh is not maximally great and thus is not God. 
If this is what we mean by "God," then the revised ontological argument is 
not an argument for the existence of God. It is an argument for the existence of 
a being who has some of the most important qualifications for being God. But 
its conclusion leaves out the most important qualification of all-it provides no 
warrant for saying that there is a morally perfect being. At best, it gives us a 
warrant for saying that there is a being who has it is within his power to be 
morally perfect. Whether this being exercises that power is a question that is 
left completely up in the air, as far as our revised ontological argument is 
concerned. 
For many this will be a disappointing conclusion. Part of the charm of the 
ontological argument has always been that it appeared to give the theist everything 
he wanted. Unfortunately, I think the revised version is the best that can be done 
without giving up the free will defense. 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
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NOTES 
I. See, for example: Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Wm. B. Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, 1977). Referred to hereafter as GFE. See also: Alvin Plantinga, The Nature afNecessity 
(Oxford University Press. 1974). especially chapters IX and X. 
2. The author who comes closest to discussing this problem is Thomas Flint. See notes 6, 7, and 
8 below. 
3. More precisely, Plantinga defines "significantly free. on a given occasion, if he is then free with 
respect to a morally significant action," where "an action is morally significant, for a given person, 
if it would be wrong for him to perform the action but right to refrain or vice versa." GFE, p. 29. 
4. Even if all of this were true, it would not by itself be sufficient to justify God in permitting as 
much moral evil as He does permit. For there are possible worlds in which there are significantly 
free agents who do more good and less evil than the creaturely inhabitants of the actual world. It's 
natural to ask why God didn't create one of those worlds instead. 
Plantinga answers this question by arguing that even an omnipotent God might not have been 
able to create any of the possible worlds that contain a better overall balance of good over evil than 
the actual world contains. Plantinga's defense of this claim is the most original aspect of his treatment 
of the free will defense. Whether he is right about this is a question that lies outside the scope of 
the present essay. The aspect of the free will defense that concerns us in the present context is the 
claim-not original with Plantinga-that moral goodness presupposes significant freedom. 
5. See GFE, pp. 108-09. Roughly, the argument runs as follows: Suppose that it is possible that 
there is a maximally great being. Then there is a world, W, in which there is a maximally great 
being. In W, therefore, it must be true that there is a being that exists and possesses maximal 
excellence in every possible world. In other words, it must be true in W that it is logically impossible 
that there is no being possessing maximal greatness. Since logical possibilities and impossibilities 
do not vary from world to world, it follows that in every world it is logically impossible that there 
is no being possessing maximal greatness. But then it is impossible in the actual world that there 
is no such being. Consequently a being possessing maximal greatness actually exists. 
6. Thomas Flint, "The Problem of Divine Freedom," American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983): 
pp. 255-64. 
7. The bulk of Flint's article is devoted to the defense of the stronger thesis that God may be both 
essentially free (with regard to which world to create) and essentially good. 
8. In fairness to Flint, his article is not concerned with precisely the same problem that I have 
raised, and he does not claim to have shown that God can be both essentially good and "significantly" 
free in Plantinga' s sense. 
9. See not 5 above. 
10. See Nelson Pike, "Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin," American Philosophical Quarterly, 
6 (1969): pp. 208-16. 
